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Equal Protection and the New Rational Basis Test:
the Mentally Retarded are not Second Class
Citizens in Cleburne
Recently, the Fifth Circuit held that classications involving the mentally
retarded were quasi-suspect and should be reviewed under a heightened scru-
tiny analysis. The Supreme Court reversed that holding but granted the re-
tarded a remedy by applying a more genuine scrutiny under the rational
basis test. The Court's decision in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc. raises the question whether the Court intends to apply an in-
creased level of scrutiny under the rational basis test or whether this case
merely respresents another ad hoc decision made on the horns of a dilemma.
This Note discusses the uncertain impact of Cleburne on the retarded and
similarly situated individuals.
I. INTRODUCTION
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
that "[n]o State shall . ..deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."1 Yet in the process of making leg-
islative judgments, the legislature creates classifications which bur-
den some groups of people and benefit others.2 The United States
Supreme Court, in its effort to single out invidious political judg-
ments, has developed three standards of review to determine
whether classifications are unduly burdensome and discriminatory.3
However, a controversy has arisen from the Court's failure to articu-
late a coherent set of principles for applying these standards. Fur-
thermore, special scrutiny raises the question of the legitimacy of
judicial review in a democratic society.4
In July, 1985, in the case of City of C7eburne, Texas v. Cleburne
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341,
344 (1949).
3. See generally United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980)
(rational basis); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate scrutiny); McLaugh-
lin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (strict scrutiny).
4. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1013-16 (1984) (discussing the "countermajoritarian difficulty" with judicial re-
view). See generally Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Con-
stitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) (the seminal article on the equal
protection clause, arguing for constraints on judicial power lest the legislature be ren-
dered impotent as a governing body). See also infra note 23.
Living Center, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court was presented with another
opportunity to clarify standards of judicial review by responding to a
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that mental retardation is a
"quasi-suspect" classification which warrants heightened scrutiny re-
view.6 The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, rejected the quasi-
suspect standard of review, instead relying on the rational basis test
to invalidate the zoning ordinance as applied to the mentally re-
tarded residents of the Featherston home.7 The holding in Cleburne
Living Center raises the question whether the Court intends to apply
an increased level of scrutiny under the rational basis test and if so,
to which classifications.8
In attempting to address these questions, this Note briefly exam-
ines the development of the standards of judicial review under the
equal protection clause as applied to legislative classifications. Addi-
tionally, this Note analyzes the content of the Cleburne Court's ma-
jority, concurring and dissenting opinions which established the level
of review for legislative classifications concerning the mentally re-
tarded and discusses the possible ramifications of this decision on fu-
ture equal protection claims.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. History of the Equal Protection Clause
The equal protection clause was enacted to prohibit state and local
governments from abusing their legislative power by arbitrarily clas-
sifying persons. It guarantees that classifications will be drawn prop-
erly to accomplish a permissible state interest, either to advance a
social good or to remedy a social mischief.9 Equal protection requires
that those who are similarly situated be treated similarly.10 In mak-
ing this determination a court will consider first, whether the legisla-
tive end is legitimate and second, whether the classification relates to
5. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
6. See Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191, 198
(5th Cir. 1984).
7. 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
8. Professor Gunther suggested that the Burger Court's application of an "inten-
sified means scrutiny" would eventually raise "the level of ... minimal [scrutiny] from
virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry." Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term Foreword In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1972).
9. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 587 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK]. See also Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 2, at
346.
10. Similarly situated refers to possession of a common trait by members of a
class. However, the real test appears to be whether a classification "includes all per-
sons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law." Tussman &
tenBroek, supra note 2, at 346. See also id. at 344-46 for a discussion of the reasonable-
ness of classifications.
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that end." If the state interest is found to be illegitimate or the clas-
sification unrelated or unduly burdensome, the classification will not
be upheld.12
The equal protection clause has evolved from being what Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes called, "the last resort of. constitutional arguments, ' '13
into "a potent egalitarian instrument."14 For nearly eighty years fol-
lowing its ratification in 1868, the equal protection clause was inter-
preted under a very lenient "rational basis" standard which afforded
great deference to legislative classifications. 15 During the 1940's, the
elements of the present equal protection analytical structure began to
take shape with the creation of a "suspect classification."16 Even so,
at the beginning of the 1960's judicial intervention was still virtually
unknown except in racial discrimination cases.' 7
The Warren Court then developed a "two-tiered" analysis based on
"a broadly-conceived egalitarianism."18 The two-tiered analysis ap-
plied a strict scrutiny standard to classifications involving "funda-
11. Id. at 367. For a discussion of legitimate state purposes, see infra note 25 and
accompanying text.
12. Tussman and tenBroek list five ways in which classifications can relate to a
legislative end: (1) perfect classification - the classifying trait exactly fits the legisla-
tive purpose; (2) totally imperfect - the classification bears no relation to the legisla-
tive purpose; (3) under-inclusive - the classification includes a small number that fit
the purpose but excludes a large number that are similarly situated; (4) over-inclusive
- the classification burdens more persons than necessary to accomplish the legislative
purpose; and (5) over- and under-inclusive - the classification does not include all
those similarly situated but includes many who are dissimilarly situated. Id. at 347-53.
See also J. NOWAK, supra note 9, at 588.
13. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
14. Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three
Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 945 (1975).
15. See, e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (holding that
Louisiana's legislatively created slaughterhouse monopoly was beyond the scope of the
fourteenth amendment). The classical statement of this view is found in Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885), where it was held that "neither the [fourteenth]
amendment - broad and comprehensive as it is - nor any other amendment, was
designed to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power,
to prescribe regulations .... "
16. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court held that
"all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immedi-
ately suspect" and must be subjected to "the most rigid scrutiny." The Court never-
theless found compelling governmental interests for enforcing the Japanese-American
wartime curfew. Id. at 216. See also Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 2, at 381 (pre-
dicting that the equal protection clause was about to come into "the most fruitful and
significant period of its career").
17. See Gunther, supra note 8, at 8.
18. See Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 945 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 103 (1970)).
mental rights"19 and "suspect classifications" while applying minimal
scrutiny or mere rationality review in all other cases. 20 Due to its
ever-increasing attention to equal protection claims, 21 the Burger
Court became dissatisfied with the rigid two-tiered, all-or-nothing
analysis. This dissatisfaction led to the development of a "middle
tier" of intermediate review during the 1970's.22 The Burger Court's
current approach to equal protection claims therefore involves the
application of three standards of review: (1) rational basis, (2) strict
scrutiny, and (3) intermediate scrutiny.
1. Rational Basis Review
Rational basis review,23 the minimal level of scrutiny, requires that
there be "some rationality in the nature of the class singled out"24 as
it relates to furthering a legitimate state interest. A legitimate state
interest is one which is designed to promote the general good of the
people.25 Under this standard of review, the Court does not require a
19. Professor Nowak lists six substantive categories of fundamental rights: (1) first
amendment rights, (2) right to vote, (3) right to interstate travel, (4) right to fairness
in the criminal process, (5) right to fairness in procedures concerning deprivations of
life, liberty, or property, and (6) right to privacy, which includes right to freedom of
choice in marital decisions. J. NOWAK, supra note 9, at 460-61. The concept of "funda-
mental rights" is outside the scope of this note. Some commentators believe that the
right to live in the "least restrictive setting" is a fundamental right which zoning ex-
clusions violate. See, e.g., Lippincott, "A Sanctuary for People": Strategies for Over-
coming Zoning Restrictions on Community Homes for Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 767, 783 (1979).
20. See Gunther, supra note 8, at 8.
21. Regarding the increased time spent addressing equal protection claims, Profes-
sor Edward L. Barrett calculates that "[d]uring the sixteen terms of the Warren Court,
equal protection claims were discussed in an average of five and one-half opinions per
year. During the ten terms of the Burger Court the average has been eighteen opin-
ions a year and twenty-two during the 1978 term." Barrett, The Rational Basis Stan-
dard for Equal Protection Review of Ordinary Legislative Classifications, 68 KY. L.J.
845, 856 (1979-80).
22. See Gunther, supra note 8, at 12. Professor Gunther identifies three themes in
Burger Court decisions: (1) reluctance to expand the scope of the new equal protection,
(2) mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court, and
(3) willingness to use the equal protection clause as an interventionist tool without
resorting to strict scrutiny language. Id.
23. Rational basis review manifests the Court's concern with issues of federalism
and maintaining an independent judiciary in a democratic government. See Maltz, Fed-
eralism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment on Democracy and Distrust, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 209, 214-21 (1981) (judicial power should be constrained by federalism
concerns). The Court, whose members are appointed for life, is reluctant to overrule
decisions made by an elected body whose actions are subject to popular review at every
election. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4-9 (1980). See also supra note 4.
24. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 995 (1978) (quoting Ri-
naldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966)).
25. Legitimate state interests are those which benefit the general good of a state,
such as regulations which "promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good or-
der of the people, and [which] . . . increase the industries of the State, develop its re-
sources, and add to its wealth and prosperity." Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. at 31.
The phrase "rationally related to a legitimate state interest" is frequently used by the
[Vol. 13: 333, 1986] Cleburne Living Center
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close fit between the classification drawn and the legislative end.26
Instead, the Court will uphold a classification if it can find any con-
ceivable rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.27
Traditionally, the Court has given great deference to the legisla-
ture as being the branch of government best suited to find the facts
and to carefully balance burdens and benefits.28 This deference by
the Court has become the "equivalent of a strong presumption of
constitutionality"29 rendering the test "toothless" for the purpose of
invalidating economic and social welfare legislation. Even though ra-
tional basis review has been considered a rubber stamp for such legis-
lation, the Court has, on several occasions, invalidated statutes under
this test.3 0
2. Strict Scrutiny Review
The maximum level of review applied by the Court is strict scru-
tiny. It is triggered when legislation affects a "suspect classification"
or a "fundamental right."31 A classification becomes "suspect" when
it is based on characteristics possessed by members of a class which
have no relevance to any legitimate state interest.32 The state bears a
Court in its application of the minimal level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976).
26. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (allowing reform to
take "one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind").
27. See generally New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam) (statute
excluding some vendors from city while allowing others to remain was rationally re-
lated to city's interest in maintaining a tourist atmosphere).
28. See L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-2, at 995.
29. Id. § 16-2, at 996. The Lochner era, 1897-1937, exemplified a deviation from
this presumption of constitutionality during which time the Court invalidated a signifi-
cant number of state and federal statutes under the rationality test. See id. §§ 8-3 to 8-
7, at 434-55.
30. At times the Court has employed an intermediate level of scrutiny under the
guise of the rational basis test. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968) (where Court used greater scrutiny than that used with general eco-
nomic or social welfare legislation because "sensitive personal rights" of illegitimate
children were involved). See generally Barrett, supra note 21, at 856-66 (listing cases
in which the Court has invalidated legislation by applying the rational basis test and
discussing increased judicial scrutiny of the rational relation of the legislation to the
state interest); Gunther, supra note 8.
31. See supra notes 16 & 19.
32. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) ("Classifications treated as sus-
pect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal."); cf id. at 223 (illegal alien
status is not a "constitutional irrelevancy"). The color of one's skin can never be con-
stitutionally relevant. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880) (stating
heavy burden in proving that the suspect classification is precisely
tailored and necessary to achieve a permissible goal of "compelling"
importance.33 The purpose of the test is to preserve substantive
values of equality by closely scrutinizing governmental choices. 34
Suspect classifications axe determined by whether a group's status
is "discrete and insular."35 Courts and commentators have recog-
nized certain indicia for determining a group's discreteness and insu-
larity, such as immutability,36 historical prejudice,37 and political
powerlessness. 38 Courts also look to whether the classification is one
"more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice."39 Only a
"that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the
States, and... no discrimination shall be made against them because of their color").
33. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 224-26 (governmental interest in deporting illegal
aliens insufficient to justify denial of education). A constitutionally compelling end
has a value so great that it justifies the limitation of fundamental constitutional values.
J. NOWAK, supra note 9, at 591-92. The only interests thus far considered compelling
have been war, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); and threat of loss of life to prisoners in custody of the
state, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (where
separation of persons in prison by race, in order to stop an outbreak of violence based
on racial conflict, was held to be a compelling state interest). This has led at least one
author to term classifications burdening minority races as "prohibited." See Nowak,
Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee - Prohib-
ited, Neutral and Permissive Classif/cations, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974).
34. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-13, at 1012. Only in rare cases has the classifica-
tion been upheld. See supra note 16. The strict scrutiny test has been referred to as
"strict in theory but fatal in fact." Gunther, supra note 8, at 8.
35. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition calling for height-
ened scrutiny). See also generally Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 713 (1985) (developing the history of Justice Stone's classic phrase, as well as its
future impact on equal protection claims).
36. An immutable characteristic cannot be controlled or altered by those bearing
it. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, J.)
("[Slex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely
by the accident of birth .... "); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 220 (illegal alien status of
minors is a "characteristic over which children can have little control"). But see id. at
219 n.19 (illegal alien status of adults is a "product of voluntary action").
37. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (Court
looks to "history of purposeful unequal treatment"). Compare Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. at 684 (in which the Court comments on classification regarding women,
stating that the "Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimina-
tion.") with Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1980) (in which the Court
finds "nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or peculiar disad-
vantages, are in need of the special solicitude of the courts").
38. This factor is designed to protect groups which are under represented in the
majoritarian political process and therefore cannot have an effect on the democratic
system. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 23, at 164 ("women have been operating at an un-
fair disadvantage in the political process"). Political powerlessness was a primary fac-
tor in extending protection to aliens, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971),
and denying it to age classifications, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
39. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14. This determination can be made on the ba-
sis of stereotypical characteristics. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
[Vol. 13: 333, 1986] Cleburne Living Center
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few classifications have been designated suspect: race,40 national ori-
gin,41 and, in some circumstances, alienage.42 It seems unlikely that
the Burger Court will declare additional classifications to be
suspect.43
3. Intermediate Scrutiny Review
When legislation involves an important fundamental interest or a
"quasi-suspect" classification, 44 the Court will apply intermediate
scrutiny.45 Under intermediate scrutiny the state must show that the
legislative means employed are "substantially related" to an impor-
tant state goal.46 This requirement implies that the state must have
more than a legitimate interest and the classification must closely re-
late to the governmental end.4 7 The Court will not engage in hypo-
thetical theorizing but will only examine the articulated or actual
purpose for the classification.48
U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (where policy of excluding men from nursing school perpetu-
ated the stereotypical notion of nursing as a "woman's job").
40. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (where the Court invali-
dated an anti-interracial marriage statute as being an invidious classification); Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (racial classifications are "immediately
suspect").
41. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (where exclusion of Mexican-
Americans from jury service was considered as equally suspect as racial
discrimination).
42. Alienage in this context refers to non-citizenship. Congress may classify ac-
cording to alienage with respect to the admission of aliens into this country, but once
admitted, discrimination based on alienage becomes suspect. Compare Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (declaring a classification based on legal alien-
age inherently suspect) with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (rejecting the
claim that "illegal aliens" are a suspect class).
43. See, e.g., L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 4 (Justices Blackmun, Stevens
and Marshall criticizing the Court for its conservative bent).
44. The phrase "quasi-suspect" classification was used by Chief Justice Burger in
his dissent in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For a general
treatment of these classifications, see Note, Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of Dis-
criminatory Intent: A New Model, 90 YALE L.J. 912 (1981).
45. The Court first acknowledged its use of intermediate review in Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("our decision today will be viewed by
some as a 'middle-tier' approach.").
46. Id. at 199. To withstand a constitutional challenge, quasi-suspect classifications
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 24, §§ 16-30 to 16-
31, at 1082-92 (describing circumstances which trigger intermediate scrutiny). See also
generally Fox, Equal Protection Analysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle Tier, and the
Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 525 (1980) (analyzing and comparing Tribe's model
with the "new equal protection" model proposed by Gunther); Gunther, supra note 8.
47. See infra note 50.
48. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-30, at 1083-84.
The ad hoc quality of intermediate review seems to result from the
Court's application of a balancing test by which quasi-suspect classi-
fications are independently examined and balanced against the
importance of the state interest.49 Although the Court's use of inter-
mediate review has been sporadic,50 it has been applied to
classifications involving gender,51 illegitimacy,52 and minor children
of illegal aliens.53 Courts have declined to extend intermediate re-
view to classifications based on age5 4 or wealth.5 5 In order to qualify
as a "quasi-suspect" classification, the group upon which the classifi-
cation is based must bear a close resemblance to "discrete and insular
minorities", thereby warranting more than minimal judicial scru-
tiny.56 The criteria used for determining the quasi-suspectness of a
class are essentially the same as those used for suspect classifications.
The difference between the two is that the quasi-suspect classifica-
tion need only further an important state interest.
B. History of the Mentally Retarded
1. Institutionalization
Approximately six and one half million Americans are classified as
legally retarded.57 These citizens have been historically mistreated 58
49. J. NOWAK, supra note 9, at 595.
50. For a discussion on how each Justice regards intermediate review, see Weid-
ner, The Equal Protection Clause: The Continuing Search for Judicial Standards, 57 U.
DET. J. URB. L. 867, 909-17 (1980). Professor Tribe points out five techniques of analy-
sis used by the United States Supreme Court which suggest that intermediate scrutiny
has been applied: (1) assessing the importance of the legislative objective; (2) demand-
ing a close fit between the classification and the legislative objective; (3) requiring cur-
rent articulation of the statutory objective; (4) limiting the use of after-thought to
supply a legislative objective; and (5) requiring that an individual be permitted to con-
test denial of the right on the grounds that such denial does not further the objectives
of the statute. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-30, at 1082-89.
51. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1981) (nursing school
policy of excluding men was not substantially related to governmental interest in ben-
efitting women because women have not been historically discriminated against in the
nursing profession); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-based age differential
in state drinking law did not substantially further state interest in reducing drunk
driving). But see Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (where Court up-
held a state "statutory rape" law holding only men criminally liable).
52. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (statute setting one year limitation
within which to bring paternity suit to identify natural father was not "substantially
related" to state's interest of preventing fraudulent claims).
53. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (intermediate review applied to statute
prohibiting education of illegal alien children).
54. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (elderly
have not experienced a history of discrimination).
55. The Court has consistently applied the rational basis test to legislation burden-
ing the poor. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (welfare benefits);
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (public housing).
56. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-31, at 1090.
57. L.A. Times, July 2, 1985, § 1, at 5, col. 2. Paul Friedman, Director of the
Mental Health Law Project, stated that:
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and considered "a menace to society and civilization; ... responsible
to a large degree for many, if not all, of our social problems." 59
During the 1920's, in an effort to protect society from the "deviant"
retarded, states engaged in large-scale institutionalization of the men-
tally retarded.60 Legislation limited the rights of the retarded to
marry and procreate6 1 as well as to vote.6 2 It was not until a half
century later that professionals began to recognize the ability of re-
tarded persons to be habilitated.63 Mental health professionals now
believe that the institutionalization of the retarded causes social and
cultural deprivation which hinders them from reaching their full po-
tential as contributing members of society.64
2. Normalization
The goal of the "normalization" movement6 5 is to make available
to the retarded, "conditions of every day living which are as close as
possible to the regular circumstances and ways of life of society."66
The group home concept is the direct progeny of the normalization
movement and is considered the principal alternative to institutional
living. Group homes aim to provide a less restrictive environment in
A person is mentally retarded when "we" say he is. Mental retardation is not
a fact but a label or classification applied to a very diverse group of people -
often for purposes of segregating or restricting them, although sometimes for
purposes of providing services not available to all in the community.
P. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 14 (1976).
58. The leading work on the developmental approach and philosophy of the men-
tally retarded is W. Wolfensburger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Model,
in CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED (R.
Kugel & W. Wolfensburger eds. 1969) (containing a discussion of the historical mis-
treatment of the mentally retarded). As early as the Puritans, the retarded were
hanged and burned, being suspected as witches. Id. at 35-36.
59. Chandler & Ross, Zoning Restrictions and the Right to Live in the Commu-
nity, in PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RE-
TARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 305, 307 (M. Kindred ed. 1976) (quoting from
Wolfensburger, supra note 58, at 102-03).
60. Id.
61. See MENOLASCINO, CHALLENGES IN MENTAL RETARDATION 54-55 (1977).
62. At least half of the states prohibit the retarded from voting. See generally
Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (contending
that state disenfranchisement provisions are unconstitutional).
63. See Boyd, Strategies in Zoning and Community Living Arrangements for Re-
tarded Citizens: Parens Patriae Meets Police Power, 25 VILL. L. REV. 273, 273-74 (1980).
64. See Lippincott, supra note 19, at 768.
65. See generally Nirje, The Normalization Principle, in PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON MENTAL RETARDATION, CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE
MENTALLY RETARDED (rev. ed. R. Kugel & A. Shearer 1976). Nirje, a Scandinavian,
developed the concept of normalization.
66. Id. at 231.
which retarded persons can develop to their full potential.67 Typi-
cally, a small number of retarded persons live in a family-type envi-
ronment with trained supervisors acting as parents.6 8 One of the
major obstacles to the establishment of group homes for the retarded
has been community resistance manifested through local zoning
ordinances. 69
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In July of 1980, Jan Hannah purchased a building in Cleburne,
Texas to establish a group home for thirteen mentally retarded men
and women. Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. (CLC)70 was to supervise
the home. Because the site was located in an R-3 district, Cleburne's
applicable zoning ordinance required that a special use permit, re-
newable annually, be obtained from the Cleburne City Council for
the construction of "hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or al-
coholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions."71
CLC accordingly applied for the permit. It was denied by a three-to-
one vote at a public hearing on October 14, 1980, based on the recom-
mendation of the Cleburne Planning and Zoning Commission. 72
Having exhausted administrative remedies, CLC, Advocacy, Inc.,73
and the Johnson County Association for Retarded Citizens
(JCARC)74 filed suit against the city and several officials in federal
district court alleging that the zoning ordinance was invalid both on
its face and as applied because it violated the equal protection rights
of the mentally retarded.75 The district court upheld the ordinance
and its application to the group home despite its determination that
the city council's decision "'was motivated primarily by the fact that
67. See Chandler & Ross, supra note 59, at 308. See generally O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (where court declared involuntary hospitalization of mentally
ill to be a violation of the constitutional right to liberty); Nirje, supra note 65 (discuss-
ing development of normalization movement).
68. Lippincott, supra note 19, at 769.
69. Included among the reasons given for resistance to group homes by commu-
nity home owners are decreased property values, safety, traffic, and noise level. Id.
70. Hannah is the vice president and part owner of CLC (presently called Commu-
nity Living Concepts, Inc.). 726 F.2d at 193. For expediency, Hannah and CLC will
both be referred to as CLC in this Note.
71. CLEBURNE, TEX., ZONING ORDINANCES § 16 (1965) (emphasis added). An R-3
district is zoned for apartment housing and allows such uses as: apartment houses,
multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, hospi-
tals, sanitariums, nursing or convalescent homes. Id. § 8 (emphasis added).
72. 726 F.2d at 194. See also infra note 97.
73. Advocacy, Inc. is "a non-profit corporation that provides legal services to de-
velopmentally disabled persons." 105 S. Ct. at 3252 n.1.
74. JCARC was found to lack standing by both the district court and the court of
appeals. 726 F.2d at 203.
75. CLC also alleged violation of the Revenue Sharing Act, 31 U.S.C. § 6716(b)(2)
(1983), and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Both claims were
dismissed by the district court and court of appeals. 726 F.2d at 194.
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the residents of the home would be mentally retarded.' "76
CLC subsequently filed suit in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. On March 5, 1984, the court of appeals re-
versed, holding that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classifica-
tion and legislation utilizing this classification must be subjected to
intermediate level scrutiny.77 The appellate court cited several fac-
tors for arriving at its determination: (1) historical mistreatment, (2)
discrimination likely reflecting deep-seated prejudice, (3) political
powerlessness, and (4) immutability of the mentally retarded condi-
tion.78 Applying a heightened scrutiny test, the court held the zoning
ordinance invalid both facially and as applied because it did not sub-
stantially further an important governmental interest.79
After a petition for a rehearing en banc was denied, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.8 0 The Supreme Court va-
cated the judgment of the appellate court on July 1, 1985, holding
that mental retardation was not a quasi-suspect classification.8 ' Nev-
ertheless, by applying the rational basis standard of review, the Court
held the ordinance invalid as applied to the respondents, potential
residents of the CLC group home.82
IV. MAJORITY OPINION
A. The Mentally Retarded are not a Quasi-Suspect Class
Justice White,83 giving the opinion for the Court, began his analy-
sis of whether mental retardation should be deemed a "quasi-sus-
pect" classification by recounting the history of the three standards
of review.8 4 He proceeded to analyze why the appellate court's
76. 105 S. Ct. at 3253 (quoting App. 93, 94). The district court held the ordinance
constitutional based on the traditional rational basis test giving great deference to the
legislature.
77. 726 F.2d at 198. This decision of the fifth circuit is the "first appellate court
decision to unequivocally adopt the intermediate level of scrutiny when dealing with
legislative discrimination against mentally retarded persons." Note, Expanding the
Quasi Suspect Class to Include Mentally Retarded Persons: Cleburne Living Center,
Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 18 AKRON L. REV. 141 (1984) (discussing the case after the
court of appeals decision but before the Supreme Court reversed).
78. 726 F.2d at 197-98. See also supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
79. 726 F.2d at 201.
80. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984).
81. 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
82. Id.
83. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehn-
quist, Stevens, and O'Connor.
84. 105 S. Ct. at 3254-55.
heightened scrutiny test was inappropriate,8 5 primarily whether the
indicia of the group's classification was "discrete and insular" in na-
ture. Justice White pointed out that the immutable characteristic of
mental retardation is "a reduced ability to cope with and function in
the everyday world."86 This is a characteristic which legislators, with
the help of "qualified professionals," may legitimately take into con-
sideration in dealing with the specific needs of such a diverse class.8 7
The Court admitted that there has been a continuing trend of legis-
lative antipathy or prejudice toward the mentally retarded, but as-
serted that the federal government had responded by enacting
legislation to provide equality to retarded persons.8 8 This positive
legislative response to the plight of the retarded led the Court to con-
clude that the retarded are not "politically powerless, in the sense
that they have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers."89
The Court stated further that applying a heightened scrutiny test
would stifle new legislation by requiring legislative bodies to more
fully justify their efforts.90
The Court argued that granting the mentally retarded quasi-sus-
pect status would open the "quasi-suspect" flood gates to equally
amorphous groups like the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and
the infirm.91 This would certainly pose new problems in reviewing
classifications. Relying on the presumption that governmental action
is legitimate and the fact that retardation is a characteristic which is
relevant to state interests,92 the majority refused to recognize the
85. His disqualification of the quasi-suspectness of the class appears to hinge on
the warning in Murgia that "the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in
our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scruti-
nize legislative choices as to whether, how and to what extent those interests should
be pursued." Id. at 3255. See also supra notes 4, 15, 22, 23 and accompanying text.
86. 105 S. Ct. at 3256. See also infra note 140.
87. 105 S. Ct. at 3256.
88. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (outlawing dis-
crimination against the handicapped in federally funded programs); Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1), (2) (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (providing for appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation in least restrictive
setting); Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1975)
(basing federal funds on integration of retarded children with non-mentally retarded
children "to the maximum extent appropriate").
89. 105 S. Ct. at 3257. Compare Note, supra note 62 (where it is argued that re-
tarded have no democratic voice) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87
(1973) (plurality opinion) (discussing underrepresentation of women in our nation's de-
cision-making bodies). See also infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
90. 105 S. Ct. at 3257.
91. Id. at 3257-58. In an analogous case, the ninth circuit held that heightened
scrutiny was appropriate in reviewing an ordinance which excluded former mental pa-
tients from an R-2 zone. J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1983).
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the status of the mentally ill,
some commentators believe they should be designated a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
See generally Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974).
92. 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
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mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class.9 3 Therefore, the Court
found rational basis to be the appropriate level of review for classifi-
cations based on retardation.
B. Rational Basis For the Retarded
Applying the rational basis standard, Justice White stated that leg-
islation distinguishing between the retarded and others must be "ra-
tionally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." 94  The
question was whether Cleburne's zoning ordinance provided such a
rational relationship. The majority felt that if requiring a special use
permit did deprive the respondents of their constitutional rights,
there would be no occasion to address the broader issue of whether
the ordinance was facially invalid or invalid as against all retarded
persons.95
Justice White pointed out that the zoning ordinance did not require
a special use permit for numerous other facilities.96 Addressing the
factors for requiring the permit,97 the Supreme Court's analysis vir-
tually repeated the appellate court's analysis.98 Both opinions as-
serted that negative attitudes and unsubstantiated fears are not
permissible bases for treating a home for the retarded differently
than apartment houses or nursing homes. 99 The city's interest in re-
ducing traffic and noise was not supported by proof that the retarded
93. Id. The Court's primary reason for not deeming the retarded quasi-suspect
seems to be that:
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed
quasi-suspect .... it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a
variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them
off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative re-
sponses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the
public at large.
Id. at 3257-58.
94. Id. at 3258. See also supra note 25.
95. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985) (stating that a
constitutional holding should not be broader than the question presented); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (Court attempts to construe statute so as to avoid
the constitutional question if possible).
96. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Boarding houses, fraternities, hospi-
tals, sanitariums and nursing homes were among the permitted uses.
97. The factors in the city council's decision included: (1) the negative attitude of
property owners located within 200 feet; (2) the fears of elderly residents of the neigh-
borhood; (3) the location of a junior high school across the street; (4) location of the
group home on a five hundred year flood plain; and (5) the size of the home and
number of people to be housed. 726 F.2d at 194.
98. Compare 105 S. Ct. at 3258-60 with 726 F.2d at 200-02.
99. 105 S. Ct. at 3259.
"drive more cars," "wander aimlessly into the streets" or create more
noise than others.100
The city's stated desire to protect the retarded from harassment by
teenagers at the junior high school across the street was rejected as a
justification after looking to the extrinsic fact that there were some
thirty retarded students attending the school. The city's interest in
protecting the future residents from the danger of flood damage
which occurs every five hundred years was also held to be insuffi-
cient justification. The retarded were likely to be better prepared
than most residents due to strict federal standards imposed on inter-
mediate care facilities.101 In fact, the Court could find no satisfactory
basis for requiring a special use permit of the mentally retarded
while not requiring it of other groups. Justice White concluded that
enforcement of the permit requirement in this case rested on "irra-
tional prejudice against the mentally retarded"'10 2 and was invalid as
applied to the Featherston home.
V. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, 0 3 agreed with the ma-
jority's application of the rational basis test as the appropriate stan-
dard of review. His philosophy of judicial review, however, is
uniquely different. 0 4 For Justice Stevens, there are not three stan-
dards of review but rather "a continuum of judgmental responses...
ranging from 'strict scrutiny' at one extreme to 'rational basis' at the
other."' 05 The tiered analysis is simply "'a method the Court has
employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in
a reasonably consistent fashion.' "106 According to Justice Stevens,
the rational basis test is the only standard to be applied when review-
ing equal protection decisions. 07
Justice Stevens posed the following three questions which he be-
lieved would determine, in most cases, whether a statute has a ra-
tional basis: "What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been
100. The City's asserted interest in reducing noise and traffic problems as a justifi-
cation for the restrictive zoning suggests that the ordinance was being enforced based
on stereotypes of the mentally retarded. Id. at 3260.
101. The retarded must be able to satisfy the federal standards imposed on an In-
termediate Care Facility for safety, including knowing how to evacuate in an emer-
gency. Telephone interview with Jan Hannah, vice president and part owner of CLC
(Oct. 22, 1985).
102. 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
103. Justice Stevens was joined in his concurrence by Chief Justice Burger.
104. On Justice Stevens' philosophy, see generally Comment, Mr. Justice Stevens:
An Examination of a Juridical Philosophy, 23 ST. LOuIS U.L.J. 126 (1979).
105. 105 S. Ct. at 3260-61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 3261 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
107. Id.
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subjected to a 'tradition of disfavor' by our laws?"108 "What is the
public purpose that is being served by the law? What is the charac-
teristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treat-
ment?"109 Asking these basic questions will result in "virtually
automatic invalidation of racial classifications and in the validation of
most economic classifications." 110 Justice Stevens points out that
there is never a rational relationship between the color of one's skin
and a legitimate state interest, whereas there is almost always some
rationality between economic classifications and legitimate state
interests."1 '
Applying this approach, Justice Stevens balanced historical mis-
treatment of the retarded against the state's legitimate interest in
dealing with the mentally retarded because of their reduced ability to
function in society. Therefore, Justice Stevens would also invalidate
the ordinance as applied to the CLC home.112 It appears however,
that Justice Stevens' rational basis continuum would be less deferen-
tial toward economic or social legislation than the test used by the
majority,113 subjecting all legislation to equal scrutiny and to a bal-
ancing of burdens and benefits.114
VI. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Marshall"l5 began his analysis by agreeing with the major-
ity that the retarded should have a remedy under the equal protec-
tion clause.116 Having thus concurred, he attacked the majority on
108. Id. (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens notes that "[t]he Court must be espe-
cially vigilant in evaluating the rationality of any classification involving a group that
has been subjected to a 'tradition of disfavor ....... "Id. at 3261 n.6 (quoting Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520-21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)). This spe-
cial vigilance seems to belie Justice Stevens' application of an intermediate form of re-
view. Weidner, supra note 50, at 915.
109. 105 S. Ct. at 3261-62 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
110. Id. at 3262.
111. Id. at 3261-62.
112. Id. at 3263.
113. It appears that Justice Stevens would be willing to subject all legislation to a
more realistic scrutiny.
114. This philosophical approach bears close resemblance to that recognized by Pro-
fessor Gunther as an early trend in the Burger Court. See generally Gunther, supra
note 8.
115. Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined in Justice Marshall's partial concur-
rence and partial dissent.
116. 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Jus-
tice Marshall advocates a sliding scale approach to equal protection claims in which the
level of scrutiny "should vary with 'the constitutional and societal importance of the
interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which
several points: first, the majority engaged in a wide ranging height-
ened scrutiny discussion while purportedly applying a rational basis
standard;li7 second, the majority was creating a "second order ra-
tional basis test";118 third, the majority applied the wrong stan-
dard;119 and fourth, the majority provided a novel, truncated as-
applied remedy.' 20
A. Two For The Price of One
Justice Marshall first criticized the Court for violating one of the
cardinal rules governing the federal courts: "[N]ever ... formulate a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is to be applied."121 When a lower court properly
decides a case by reaching unnecessary constitutional issues, the
Supreme Court has generally affirmed on the narrower ground avail-
able without reaching the broader interpretation. 22 Thus, having de-
cided on the rational basis test, the Court should have declined to
address heightened scrutiny.' 23
B. Second Order Rational Basis
Justice Marshall next pointed out that the majority, though pur-
porting to apply rational basis review, nonetheless subjected the ordi-
nance to "precisely the sort of probing inquiry associated with
heightened scrutiny."24 The standard used by the majority is not
the traditional rational basis test set out in Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co.,125 which gave great deference to the legislature. Rather, it is one
which "sift[s] through the record to determine whether policy deci-
sions are squarely supported by a firm factual foundation."126 The
the particular classification is drawn.'" Id. at 3265 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). See also Weidner, supra
note 50, at 912.
117. 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. Id. at 3264. This new rational basis test is the result of applying heightened
scrutiny analysis under the guise of rational basis. The Court has done this on previ-
ous occasions. Id. at 3265 n.4. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
119. 105 S. Ct. at 3268 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. Id. at 3272. Justice Marshall felt the remedy was truncated because it did not
strike down the ordinance on its face but merely invalidated it as applied to the CLC
home residents. Id.
121. Id. at 3263 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. at 2801). In-
terestingly, this is precisely what the majority purported to be doing. See supra note
95 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972).
123. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 n.9 (declining to ad-
dress strict scrutiny when heightened scrutiny is sufficient).
124. 105 S. Ct. at 3264 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. 348 U.S. at 489 (where "reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to
the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind").
126. 105 S. Ct. at 3264. See also Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196 (1983).
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Court has thus shifted the burden to the legislature to prove a ra-
tional relationship to the classification.127
Justice Marshall criticized the Court's application of the rational
basis test as "a small and regrettable step backward" toward Loch-
ner.*28 As the Court has provided no principled foundation for apply-
ing a more searching inquiry under the rational basis standard, lower
courts are left in the dark and are likely to follow the precedent set
in this case by invalidating more economic and social legislation in
the future.129
C. Equal Protection Demands Heightened Scrutiny
Justice Marshall, after discussing at length the history of height-
ened scrutiny review, focused his attention on the factors relating to
the mentally retarded which demand this standard. First, the exclu-
sion of group homes deprives the retarded of a fundamental lib-
erty. 3 0 Second, the retarded have been subjected to a "lengthy and
tragic history"'13 of discrimination which rivaled and paralleled "the
worst excesses of Jim Crow."132
Further, Justice Marshall pointed out the inconsistency in the ma-
jority's argument that because Congress had enacted legislation bene-
fitting the retarded, the retarded could not be considered politically
powerless.133 The Court applied the opposite analogy regarding gen-
der in Frontiero v. Richardson, where it was indicated that because
"'Congress itself has concluded that classifications based on sex are
127. See 105 S. Ct. at 3260 (majority opinion) (" 'The City never justifies its appar-
ent view .... ') (quoting 726 F.2d at 202) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (where the court invalidated legislation regulating
number of hours bakery personnel could work). See also supra note 29.
129. 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 3266. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right to "establish
a home" is a fundamental liberty). See generally Chandler & Ross, supra note 59,
Currently group homes are the principle alternative to institutionalization that the re-
tarded have for living in the community. See supra note 67.
131. 105 S. Ct. at 3266 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). See Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978) (using "lengthy and tragic history" to
distinguish racial classifications from classifications based on gender). See also Chan-
dler & Ross, supra note 59, at 306-07.
132. 105 S. Ct. at 3266 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). See generally
Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive
Era, Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1982) (discussing racial
prejudice under Jim Crow laws).
133. 105 S. Ct. at 3268 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
inherently invidious,'" the Court likewise should do the same. 3 4
The Court has never suggested that a classification becomes less sus-
pect simply by virtue of extensive beneficial legislation. 135 Justice
Marshall concluded that "[flor the retarded, just as for Negroes and
women, much has changed in recent years, but much remains the
same."136
D. Applied Analysis of An As-Applied Remedy
Justice Marshall finally addressed the majority's "preferred course
of adjudication", which invalidated the ordinance only as applied to
the respondents in this case. 137 The paradox is that the majority,
having held that the ordinance rested on "irrational prejudice against
the mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the
Featherston facility,"'138 still invalidated it only as applied to the re-
spondents. However, the Court was apparently acting under the be-
lief that the ordinance might be "rational" in relation to a sub-group
of the retarded.139
Criticizing this reasoning, Justice Marshall pointed to the overin-
clusiveness of the ordinance. Nine-tenths of the group covered by
the statute were similarly situated.140 Nevertheless, the nine-tenths
were excluded on the basis of the one-tenth. Justice Marshall fur-
ther stated that the Court had deviated from former precedent which
struck down "impermissibly overbroad generalizations. '"141 This type
of as-applied remedy poses future problems by placing on the courts
"the task of redrafting the statute through an ongoing and cumber-
134. Id. at 3269 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 687).
135. Id. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984) (racial classifications are still
suspect).
136. 105 S. Ct. at 3269 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. Id. at 3258. The majority preferred this course in order to avoid making "un-
necessarily broad constitutional judgments." Id.
138. Id. at 3260 (emphasis added).
139. Since the rational basis test does not require a close fit between the classifica-
tion and legislative purpose the Court could justify not invalidating the ordinance
completely.
140. 105 S. Ct. at 3273 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
There are four categories of mental retardation which are based on the level of intelli-
gence quotient (I.Q.): (1) Mild - I.Q. 50 to 70 (89% of all retardates are educable), (2)
Moderate - I.Q. 35 to 50 (6% are trainable), (3) Severe - I.Q. 20 to 35, and (4) Profound -
IQ under 20 (remaining 5% fall into categories 3 & 4 and are totally dependent). 105 S.
Ct. at 3256 n.9. These categories seem to have been drawn for administrative purposes,
but legislation which pertains to five percent of the class can never justify exclusion of
the whole class. Furthermore, due to the high federal standards placed on group
homes, it is unlikely that the ordinance would pertain to even five percent of the
group as the severely and profoundly retarded are rarely admitted as residents to
these facilities.
141. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating in
toto a maternity leave policy which was rationally related to only a small percentage of
teachers).
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some process of 'as-applied' constitutional rulings."142 The alterna-
tive approach and the preferred course of adjudication, in Justice
Marshall's view, would have been to invalidate the ordinance in toto,
thus putting the responsibility back on the legislature to redraft out-
moded and discriminatory legislation.1 43
VII. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's holding in City of C7eburne, Texas v.
C7eburne Living Center appears to be another "ad hoc doctrine
flexible enough to accommodate a cautious Court's preference for
mildly progressive results."144 This case presented to the Court the
question of whether mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classifica-
tion. In the process of deciding that question, the holding raises many
more questions. How will the Court apply standards of judicial re-
view in future equal protection claims? Is the rational basis test
evolving? How has this decision helped retarded citizens? What does
this decision mean for other groups?
The Court has emphatically embraced the fact that it uses three
standards of review: rational basis, heightened scrutiny and strict
scrutiny. By refusing to deem the mentally retarded a "quasi-sus-
pect" class, the Court has reaffirmed its unwillingness to broaden
current suspect and quasi-suspect categories, the implication being
that the current suspect and quasi-suspect categories will be frozen to
the existing classifications. Heightened scrutiny will be applied to
gender, illegitimacy and minor children of illegal aliens, and strict
scrutiny to classifications based on race, national origin and alienage.
Other classifications will be reviewed under the rational basis test.
Perhaps the reason for not granting the retarded quasi-suspect sta-
tus was pragmatic: the Court would have had to deal with an influx
of equally amorphous groups like the aged, the disabled, the mentally
ill, the poor and others. The Court seems to have ascertained, how-
ever, that the immutable characteristic of a reduced ability to cope in
the everyday world is relevant to many state interests, both to bene-
fit the retarded and to protect other citizens.
Has the Court created a second order rational basis test? The
Court has on previous occasions used a stricter rational basis test, so
142. 105 S. Ct. at 3274. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. Id. at 3273. Justice Marshall notes that the current Cleburne zoning ordinance
was a redrafted version of a previous ordinance dating back to 1929, a time when dis-
crimination against the retarded was at its worst. Id. at 3268 n.17.
144. Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 946.
one cannot legitimately say this is a new test.145 Perhaps a better
question is whether this form of rational basis scrutiny will become a
precedent or will it simply be limited to the facts of this particular
case?
Considering the nature of this case, and the history of prejudice
against the retarded, it seems obvious that justice requires a remedy
in favor of the retarded. On this point, all nine justices unanimously
agreed. A remedy could have been supplied under heightened scru-
tiny, requiring a holding that retardation is a quasi-suspect classifica-
tion, or under a rational basis test involving more genuine scrutiny.
(It could not have been supplied under the traditional deferential ra-
tional basis test.) Faced with these two alternatives, the majority
once again chose the more cautious course, "the preferred course of
adjudication." Having made the decision, the remainder of the opin-
ion seems to be a justification and limitation of its consequences.
The natural consequences might have been a "small and regretta-
ble step back" toward the Lochner era. However, the Court's intent
in utilizing an "as-applied" remedy appears to be to impede such a
constitutional step by limiting the decision to the facts. This ade-
quately constrains judicial intrusion into legislative decisions and
sends out the message that "the courts [are] very reluctant, as they
should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separa-
tion of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices."146 The Court
still believes that legislators, with the help of qualified professionals,
are best suited to the task of dealing with the special needs of diverse
classes of people. 147 Although an as-applied remedy may lead to a
greater congestion in the courts by requiring a case by case adjudica-
tion, courts could still summarily dispose of a case if the facts are
similar enough to C7eburne. The Court may have intended to dis-
courage such an influx of equal protection claims by rendering a nar-
row holding.
Will such a narrow holding help retarded citizens? Certainly "the
justices have given out the message that the retarded aren't second
class citizens and can't be pushed aside into industrial areas of the
city."148 At the same time, the Court has determined that "the re-
tarded don't pose any more of a threat to the community than any
other group,"149 such as fraternities or nursing home residents. The
145. See supra note 30.
146. 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
147. Id. at 3256.
148. L.A. Times, July 2, 1985, § 1, at 5, col. 2 (quoting Diane Shisk, supervising at-
torney for Advocacy, Inc.).
149. Telephone interview with Diane Shisk, supervising attorney for Advocacy, Inc.
(Oct. 22, 1985). Diane Shisk mentioned that this decision would definitely help the
mentally retarded. As a result of this decision, Texas passed a law allowing group
homes of up to six residents to be established in any residential district in any city.
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Court's holding in C7eburne may allow bigotry and prejudice to con-
tinue on the books;150 it may also determine how cities will interpret
similar ordinances.151 It is ironic, in view of the expressed fears of
the Cleburne residents, that two weeks after the Featherston Home
began operating, it held an open house for the community; at that
time, most of the neighboring residents were unaware that the home
had been functioning. 152 Though the retarded would have benefitted
far more by a determination that they constituted a quasi-suspect
class, the real import of the decision may be its future impact on
other equally amorphous groups.
The logical effect is that other amorphous groups like the mentally
ill, the infirm, the aged, the poor and homosexuals will likewise be
reviewed under this second order rational basis test. The Court has
already indicated in Murgia153 that classifications based on age will
receive rational basis review. Although the Ninth Circuit held the
mentally ill to be a quasi-suspect class in City of Tacoma,154 the
Cleburne decision will probably alter that status. For groups which
have a medical disability, science and medicine will probably provide
the basis for determining whether the classification is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state end.
AIDS victims, for example, will probably have to await a medical
explanation to determine whether they may legitimately be excluded
from campuses or schools. As long as the communicability of the dis-
ease remains uncertain, however, the state's interest in protecting the
lives of its citizens will probably override the individual's interest in
pursuing an education on campus. Although homosexuals have had
difficulty obtaining intermediate review (due to the questionable na-
ture of the class' "immutable" characteristic), unless science or
medicine can prove immutability from birth, this group will likely be
However, at the time of the telephone conversation, Ms. Shisk was involved in litiga-
tion in another city, representing a group home which was excluded from an area
based on a restrictive covenant. Id.
150. Id.
151. Shortly after the litigation in this case began, Concepts in Community Living,
Inc. (formerly Cleburne Living Center, Inc.) established a group home in Keen, Texas.
Keen has an ordinance which is almost identical to the ordinance in Cleburne. The
City Council in Keen, however, analogized the mental retardation facility to a board-
ing house or a fraternity thereby circumventing the necessity of a special use permit.
Telephone interview with Jan Hannah, Vice President and part-owner of Concepts in
Community Living, Inc. (Oct. 22, 1985).
152. Id.
153. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
154. 720 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1983).
subject to a heightened rational basis scrutiny. However, there still
exists the possibility that homosexuals will ultimately find refuge
under the fundamental right to privacy doctrine.155
Some statutes may have to be rewritten "through an ongoing and
cumbersome process of 'as applied' constitutional rulings."156
Nevertheless, for many groups, it appears that the holding in
Cleburne Living Center will lead to a more scrutinizing judicial in-
quiry into legislative classifications thereby requiring the government
to prove its motivation as something more than mere stereotypes and
prejudice.157
VIII. CONCLUSION
Equal protection claims are a constant reminder of the paradox in-
herent in many democratic ideals. The Supreme Court has struggled
with equal protection standards of review because it must balance, on
the one hand, "liberty," and on the other, "justice for all." The para-
dox presented by these concepts is, as one commentator has stated,
that "equality is liberty's great enemy and can be purchased only at
an unacceptable price to freedom."15 8
The Court must balance these two fundamental ideals of democ-
racy through the equal protection clause. It is unlikely that the con-
troversy surrounding standards of judicial review of classifications
will be quickly resolved. Moreover, the democratic system inher-
ently questions judicial review of majoritarian decisions by a
countermajoritarian body. Although the Supreme Court is still wres-
tling with this problem, the holding in C7eburne Living Center indi-
cates that it is unwilling to allow injustice.
While the Court's application of a heightened rational basis scru-
tiny seems to be preferable to deeming the mentally retarded a
"quasi-suspect" class, the majority's as-applied remedy remains inade-
quate. Zoning exclusions present a great obstacle to the ultimate goal
of training the educable retarded to be contributing members of soci-
ety. Ordinances of the Cleburne type are unnecessarily limiting.
155. The Court has thus far refused to review whether there might be a constitu-
tional right to privacy involving a homosexual act between consenting adults. E.g., En-
slin v. Wallford, 565 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Enslin v. Bean, 436
U.S. 912 (1978). See generally Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right
to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1977). Some commentators be-
lieve there should be a constitutional right to live a particular lifestyle. See, e.g., Wil-
kinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
563 (1977).
156. 105 S. Ct. at 3274 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Wash. Post, July 2, 1985, at A5, col. 1 (quoting Burt Neuborne, Litigation Di-
rector, American Civil Liberties Union). The ACLU was one of many groups to sub-
mit an amicus brief.
158. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-1, at 991.
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Such ordinances are intended to be applied only to the noneducable
retarded who comprise only five percent of all retarded persons;
however, they remain in effect against all of the retarded. Had the
majority invalidated the ordinance on its face, it would have placed
the onus on the legislature to more closely tailor its ordinance to
meet the legislative end. This would have had far reaching implica-
tions for all poorly drafted zoning ordinances.
Nevertheless, for the retarded and other groups upon which the
decision will have an impact, the Court's "preferred course of adjudi-
cation" can be seen as another small step in the direction of narrow-
ing the gap between strict scrutiny and minimal scrutiny "by raising
the level of the minimal from virtual abdication to genuine judicial
inquiry." 5 9 For the retarded and these other groups, Cleburne Liv-
ing Center may hold a promise of equal protection under the rational
basis test.
GORDON W. JOHNSON
159. Gunther, supra note 8, at 24.

